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The Doctrine of Wilful Blindness
LARRY C. WILSON*
The following paper examines a recent development in the evolution 
of mens rea. The author traces the history of the doctrine of wilful 
blindness and how it has been interpreted by the courts since its 
beginnings in forgery cases during the earl\ nineteenth century 
through R. v. Sault Ste. Marie (1978).
Where knowledge is required as a requisite element of a criminal 
offence general principle dictates that proof of such knowledge rests 
with the Crown. It is equally settled law that the Crown need not prove 
knowledge by direct evidence. In the vast majority of criminal cases 
direct evidence of knowledge or lack of it is unavailable. Since knowledge 
is a state of mind it must be found, failing an admission by the accused 
of that state of mind, in the same way as intent, by proper inferences 
from facts proved.1
Traditionally the Courts have refrained from invoking civil tests of 
responsibility in criminal cases requiring proof of knowledge. If  the 
defendant did not know, he cannot be convicted, however negligent he 
may have been in not obtaining knowledge.2 Devlin J. has succinctly 
stated the principle as follows: “The case o f merely neglecting to make 
inquiries is not knowledge at all — it comes within the legal conception 
of constructive knowledge, a conception which, generally speaking, has 
no place in the-criminal law.”3
Thus, as Judge Graburn noted, there is a particular school of thought 
that actual knowledge must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to be 
brought home to the accused. 4 However, adherents of this position do 
recognize what Glanville Williams calls “one strictly limited exception” — 
the doctrine o f wilful blindness:
*LL.B., 1974 (Saskatchewan), LL.M., 1976 (Manitoba). Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University 
of Windsor.
lR. v. KeUy, [1967] 1 C.C.C. 215, at 222 (B.C.C.A.) per Bull J.A.
*C. Williams, Criminal Law, 2nd ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1961), at 157.
1Roper v. Taylor's Ltd., [1951] 2 T.L.R. 284, at 289 (K.B.)per Devlin, J.
4L. Graburn, "Burdens of Proof and Presumptions" in Studies in Canadian Criminal Evidence, 
R. Salhany and R. Carter, eds. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1972), at 64. Granville Williams, supra, foot­
note 2, at 157 stated: "Knowledge, then, means either personal knowledge or (in the licence cases) 
imputed knowledge. In either event there is someone with actual knowledge.”
176 U.N.B. LAW JOURNAL
Men readily regard their suspicions as unworthy o f  them when it is to their 
advantage to do so. T o meet this, the rule is that if a party has his suspicions 
aroused but then deliberately omits to make further enquiries, because he 
wishes to remain in ignorance, he is deem ed to have knowledge. Lord 
Sumner said: [The Zamora, [1921] 1 A.C. 801, 812] ‘There are two senses 
in which a man is said not to know something because he does not want to 
know it. A thing may be troublesome to learn, and the knowledge o f  it, 
when acquired, may be uninteresting or distasteful. T o refuse to know any 
more about the subject or anything at all is then a wilful but a real ignorance.
On the other hand, a man is said not to know because he does not want 
to know, where the substance o f the thing is borne in upon his mind with a 
conviction that full details or precise proofs may be dangerous, because they 
may embarrass his denials or compromise his protests. In such a case he flatters 
him self that where ignorance is safe, ‘tis folly to be wise, but there he is wrong, 
for he has been put upon notice and his further ignorance, even though 
actual and complete, is a mere affectation and disguise.’5
Lord Sum ner’s definition has required some refinement. Williams 
suggested that the phrase “even though actual and complete” may be 
misleading when read in conjunction with the preceeding words “where 
the substance o f the thing is borne in upon his m ind.” He concluded 
that the doctrine of wilful blindness comes into play when there is a 
suspicion which the accused deliberately omits to turn into certain 
knowledge.6 In Roper v. Tayfor Ltd., Devlin J. called it “knowledge of the 
second degree” which, in his opinion, was actual knowledge in the eyes 
of the law.7 Lord Hewart C.J., in Evans v. Dell, found wilful blindness 
when “the respondent deliberately refrained from making inquiries the 
result o f which he might not care to have.”8
The American Model Penal Code has defined the doctrine of wilful 
blindness as follows: “When knowledge of the existence of a par­
ticular fact is an element of an offence, such knowledge is established 
if a person is aware of a substantial probability o f its existence, unless he 
actually believes that it does not exist.”9 (emphasis added) In the alterna­
tive, Williams stated:
Before the doctrine o f wilful blindness applies, there must be realisation that 
the fact in question is probable, or, at least, ‘possible above the average.’
T his is illustrated by the cases on receiving. On a charge o f  receiving it is 
sufficient that the accused believed the goods were stolen, [J?. v. White,
[1859] 175 E.R. 898] i.e., believed they were probably stolen; and even 
thought he thinks there is some possibility o f  being wrong, his omission 
to enquire in the face o f  his knowledge o f  probability would, it is sub­
mitted, be accounted knowledge. On the other hand, realisation o f  possi-
•Evans v. Dell, [1937] 1 AU E.R. 349, at 353 (K.B.) per Lord Hewart. C.J. 
•Model Penal Code, *. 2.02 (7) (T .l). No. 4, p. 14, at 129-30.
'Williams, supra, footnote 2, at 157-158.
•Ibid., at 158.
1Supra, footnote 3, at 288.
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bility would not be accounted knowledge, for there is almost always the bare 
possibility that the goods one buys have been stolen at some time in the 
past. T here must have been som ething actually to put the accused on enquiry.
Hence in Harvard [i?. v. Harvard (1914), 11 Cr. App. R. 2], another receiving 
case, it was held to be wrong to direct the jury that if a man is reckless 
and does not care, he is just as guilty as if  he received the property, 
knowing at the time that there was something wrong with it. Recklessness 
and ‘not caring’ are not quite the same thing as wilful blindness; such words 
express the latter doctrine rather too widely. Similarly, suspicion is not sufficient 
if  the defendant could not make up his mind positively [/i. v. Court, [1954J 
Crim. L.R. 662]; though it will be wilful blindness if, having the suspicion, he 
failed to make further enquiries because he wished to enrich himselt even at 
the risk o f  participating in the fruits o f  crim e.10
In England, the doctrine of wilful blindness had its beginnings in 
early 19th century forgery cases.11 The notion that wilful blindness is 
equivalent to knowledge is a fairly recent development in this country.12 
In the first half o f this century the doctrine of wilful blindness was 
restricted almost exclusively to cases involving possession of stolen goods. 
However, in the past ten years use of the doctrine has expanded rapidly. 
Courts began to apply the doctrine of wilful blindness to cases involving 
possession and importation of narcotics. Recently they have used this rule 
in cases ranging from misleading advertising to offences against the 
environment.
Most of the early possession cases were decided on the basis of the 
doctrine of recent possession.13 Although the courts refrained from using 
such phrases as “wilfully blind” or “wilful blindness”, the language of the 
decisions clearly demonstrates recognition o f the principle. The Supreme 
Court of Canada decision, Lopatinsky v. The King has been cited as an
'*Supra, footnote 2, at 158-159.
"R. v. Gilts (1827), 168 E.R. 1227. See also R. v. Forbes (1835), 173 E.R. 93; R. v. Parish (1837). 
173 E.R. 413; R. v. Beard (1837), 173 E.R. 434. Williams also cited a case in which the doctrine 
of wilful blindness was invoked in a case involving a charge of obtaining by false pretences: R. v. 
Butcher (1858), 169 E.R. 1145.
“ The topic has generated little academic comment: "The only reference appears to be in the 5th 
edition o f Trem eear and two comment* in the Criminal L.aw Quarterly in Volumes 3 and 4. 
Trem eear, at 25, under the topic heading: “Knowledge As Element o f the Offence" contains this 
passage: “Knowledge will be presumed if the accused could, by proper enquiry, have ascertained 
the true facts." The late learned editor o f Trem eear, A. B. Harvey, Q.C., ascribes his authority 
for the proposition to Baldwin et aL [(1934), 24 Can. Abr. 306], a case involving the issuance o f a 
liquor license contrary to law.
In the Criminal Law Quarterly in Volume 3, at 305, and Volume 4, at 245, in a section 
entitled From the Editor’s Note Book, C. C. Savage, Q.C. commented on the objective vis-a-vis subjective 
test of criminal liability. These comments were provoked by the decision of the House o f Lords 
in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Smith [[I960] 3 All E.R. 161 (H. o f L.)] and are not concerned 
with the doctrine generally, and clearly do not purport to be commentaries on the general 
applicability o f the doctrine of wilful blindness as it applies to the whole structure o f the criminal 
law." G rabum , supra, footnote 4, at 66.
“ See N. Primrose, Fantastic Facets of the Doctrine of Recent Possession, (1959) 1 Crim. L. Q. 394; 
R. M. W. Chitty, Q.C., Recent Possession, (1959) 2 Crim. L. Q. 196; J. D. Morton, Burdens o f Proof 
and the Doctrine of Recent Possession, (1959) 2 Crim. L. Q. 183.
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example.14 Lopatinsky was charged with retaining in his possession, 
knowing them to have been stolen, sixteen tires, the property of the Govern­
ment of Canada. Several o f the stolen tires were found in the home of the 
accused. Evidence indicated that Lopatinsky had received and retained 
them for the purpose of effecting a sale. Affirming conviction, Estey J. 
stated:
Under these circumstances, the disposition o f  the tires at approximately one- 
half of their market value is significant. It was this fact, or it together with 
the other circumstances that caused Congdon to take the serial numbers o f  these 
tires and before concluding the purchase to communicate with the police and 
ascertain if these tires were listed as stolen.
Throughout the evidence o f  both Taylor and Congdon there is no suggestion  
that any explanation was offered on the part o f  the accused as to the 
circumstances under which he was in possession o f  these tires which had 
been stolen but two or three days prior thereto.
The evidence o f  guilty knowledge in this as in so many cases is not directly 
deposed to. The unexplained fact o f  recent possession is evidence thereof:
R. v. Schama (1914), II Cr. App. R. 45; Wills on Circumstantial Evidence,
7th ed., p. 93; Taylor on F.vidence. 12th ed., vol 1, s. 140.
In this case, however, the Crown had not relied upon the mere fact o f  recent 
possession but has adduced evidence o f  conduct upon the part o f  the accused, 
both with respect to his reception and disposition o f the tires and as to the sale 
o f  a portion thereof. T hese facts were all adduced in evidence and no 
explanation tendered in regard thereto. As disclosed in this record they 
admit o f  no doubt as to the guilt o f the accused.15
More explicit statements adhering to the doctrine of wilful blindness 
are found in subsequent decisions. For example, in R. v. Chimirri16 the 
appellant was charged with unlawfully receiving a large quantity of stolen 
cigarettes and tobacco from three employees of a large superm arket. The 
goods which were the subject-matter of the charge were found in the 
possession of the appellant at his home. The thieves had told Chimirri 
that they were permitted by their employer to acquire goods at wholesale 
prices. Chimirri denied all knowledge o f the fact that the merchandise 
was stolen and as an explanation o f nis purchases stated that he believed 
the story o f the superm arket employees. In previous transactions, the 
appellant had purchased large quantities of perishable goods at approxi­
mately one-half the general retail price o f the articles. In the Ontario 
Court of Appeal Aylesworth J.A. stated:
14Lopatinsky v. The King (1948), 91 C.C.C. 289 (S.C.C.).
Judge G raburn commented: "It may be asserted that the doctrine of recent possession may, 
if the court or jury see fit to adopt it, and in the absence of an explanation which might reasonably 
be true, impart knowledge of the illegal character o f the goods involved to an accused in a receiving 
rase. However, quite apart from the doctrine o f recent possession, wilful blindness as secondary’
knowledge has been adopted bv the Canadian courts. Merelv because a person pays a ridiculously 
low price in the purchase o f stolen goods would not constitute actual knowledge of their stolen 
character to the purchaser. Clearly the vendor may be in need of ready cash, or may have an 
abundance of items for himself, and many other factors could cause him to sell the goods at a 
ludicrously low price. But the courts have consistently held that purchasing goods at a low price 
is a significant factor in inferring guilty knowledge.” Graburn, supra, footnote 4, at 67.
'*L>patinsky v. The King, supra, at 292-293 per Et ey, J.
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Little need be said concerning the rejection by the trial Judge o f  the 
appellant’s explanation. Large quantities o f  the store’s merchandise had 
been purchased in a course o f  dealing between the thieves and the appellant 
extending over several m onths and at one-half the retail price. T he youth o f  
the thieves and the quantities o f  perishable food offered for sale by them at one 
time were facts in themselves such as to arouse suspicion in an honest man and put 
him on inquiry. No inquiries in fact had ever been made by the appellant 
from the store management. No explanation o f  how he came to be in 
possession o f  the articles seized by the police had ever been attempted by him 
before his trial. All these facts amply justify the conclusion reached by the 
trial Judge that appellant’s belated explanation could not reasonably be 
true.17 (emphasis added)
Similar approaches have been taken in other provinces. In R. v. 
Cooper, 18 a decision of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, the appellant was 
charged with possession o f a num ber o f stolen electrical appliances. He 
was found in possession o f goods stolen by one Covin. Cooper insisted 
that he thought Covin was selling the goods to him at wholesale prices. 
In fact, the prices paid for the goods were substantially less than their 
wholesale value. The Court applied the doctrine of recent possession 
and dismissed Cooper’s appeal. Following the Supreme Court of Canada 
decision, Ungaro v. The King , 19 the Court held that because the trial Judge 
found the appellant’s explanation of his possession of the stolen goods to be 
false, it was unnecessary for him to consider whether this explanation 
might reasonably be true. However, MacQuarrie J. added the following 
comments:
The appellant must have known that the price accepted by Covin for each 
appliance (slightly more in total than one-half the W estinghouse wholesale 
price to dealers) was a very strong indication that the appliances had been
obtained illegally ..........T his fact alone, the price paid by the accused and
accepted by Covin, must have convinced the accused that there was something
w ron g ..........T he Crown’s case against the appellant was not limited to proof
o f  recent possession. T he whole o f the evidence as to the price that was paid, 
including the evidence o f  the appellant, is inconsistent with the appellant’s*
'*R. v. Chimirri (1954), 107 C.C.C. 342 (Ont. C.A.).
l1IbuL, at 345-346 per Aylesworth, J.A.
■•/?. v. Cooper, [1964] 1 C.C.C. 353 (N.S.S.C.).
" Ungaro v. The King, [1950] S.C.R. 430. At 431 Rinfret, C.J.C. stated: “I do not understand Chief 
Justice D uffs statement in Richler v. The King, [1939] 4 D.L.R. 281 at p. 282 . . .  as meaning that 
if the trial Judge does not believe the accused it is, nevertheless, his duty to apply his mind to a 
consideration as to whether the explanation given by the accused might reasonably be true. If  the trial 
Judge does not believe the accused the result is that no explanation at all is left, and the case would 
have to be decided on the well-known principle that possession of recently stolen property is circum­
stantial evidence o f guilt."
In Richler v. The King, at 282-283 Duff, C.J.C. said: “The question, therefore, to which it was the 
duty o f the learned trial Judge to apply his mind was not whether he was convinced that the explanation 
given was the true explanation, but whether the explanation might reasonably be true; or, to put it in 
other words, whether the Crown had discharged the onus of satisfying the learned trial Judge 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the explanation of the accused could not be accepted as a reasonable 
one and that he was guilty.”
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denial o f  guilty knowledge, and together with the rest o f  the evidence admits 
o f  no doubt (as the learned trial Judge has found) as to the guilt o f  the 
accused.10
In R. v. McRitchie,21 the Alberta Court o f Appeal also based its 
decision primarily on the doctrine o f recent possession. The appellant 
had received a pair of stolen binoculars from a person whom he knew 
was a convicted thief. It was uncertain upon the evidence that he had ever 
been told that the goods were stolen, and McRitchie vehemently denied 
such knowledge. He held the goods for two or three weeks and returned 
them to the thief upon request. No money changed hands during these 
transactions. The appeal was dismissed. Johnson J.A. stated:
In the present case, the binoculars were received through the instrumen­
tality o f  Sabit, a convicted thief, under circumstances which cried out 
for an explanation  o f  their origin . U nder those circum stances, a 
sim ple denial o f  any know ledge that they were stolen is not an 
adequate explanation. Such a denial, in the circum stances o f  this 
case, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determ ine that a state­
ment that he did not know they were stolen could or could not 
reasonably be true.*1
In his dissenting judgm ent, Clinton J. Ford J.A. also adopted the 
wilful blindness theme:
It may appear clear enough that the accused should, or might have had a 
suspicion that the binoculars were stolen, but that is not enough to warrant
the conclusion that he well knew that they w e r e ..........I cannot but draw the
conclusion that the reasons for judgm ent indicate that the circumstances 
under which the binoculars were received and the explanation o f  the accused 
were not considered as to whether a reasonable explanation, that is, as an 
explanation that might reasonably be true, had been given, so as to be 
ground for reasonable doubt that he well knew they were stolen. That this 
was the question to be decided is quite clear from the judgm ent o f Kerwin J.,
now C .J .C ., delivered by Estey J .  in Ungaro v. The K in g ..........T he question
not having been considered by the learned trial Judge it is necessary for 
this Court to deal with it; and I would hold that under the circumstances 
the explanation o f  the accused may reasonably be true.*3
Thus, in most circumstances, mere denial of knowledge will not 
afford an effective defence to a charge of possession of stolen goods. 
Similarly, it may not be sufficient to merely inquire if the goods are 
stolen. In R. v. Pomeroy,24 the appellant purchased a num ber of tires at 
considerably less than the wholesale price. During the course of the
"Supra, footnote 18, at 361-364 per MacQuarrie. J.
*'«. v. McRxUhte (1956), 116 C.C.C. 73 (Alta. C.A.).
"IbuL, at 81 per Johnson J.A. at 81; “I am not prepared to say that under certain circumstances 
such a denial might not be a sufficient explanation which the Court could hold to be one which 
reasonably might be true.”
**R. v. Pomeroy (1936), 67 CCC. 71 (B.C.C.A.).
"Supra, footnote 21, at 77-79 per Clinton J. Ford, J.A.
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negotiations Pomeroy twice asked if the goods were stolen and on both 
occasions he was assured by the seller that they were not. His appeal 
from conviction was heard by the British Columbia Court o f Appeal. 
T hree of the Judges limited their comments to the question of proper 
evidence of identification of the stolen tires. The fourth Judge, 
McPhillips J.D., spoke to the issue o f Pomeroy’s inquiry in his dissenting 
judgm ent:
I see no evidence to indicate in any way that the accused was aware o f  the 
fact that the tires had been stolen. I see nothing reasonably to put him upon 
inquiry other than the inquiry he made, he asked, ‘‘T hey are not stolen tires, 
are they.''” And he is given the assurance that they were not stolen. What 
more could he do? He could refuse to buy the tires no doubt. Some men 
are more careless than others, but that does not necessarily make them criminals.
T here is nothing tc indicate a criminal intent.15
T he Court split and Pomeroy’s appeal from conviction was dis­
missed.
The clearest recognition of the doctrine of wilful blindness in a 
possession case — again, without using those exact words, comes from the 
decision of R. v. Marabella.26 The accused purchased a considerable 
amount o f stolen copper at a very low price. Marabella was charged with 
possession of stolen goods. At his trial, evidence established that he asked 
the seller where he had purchased the copper. When he was told, “Never 
mind, if you do not want to buy it, we will take it to Hamilton”, no further 
inquiries were made. Counsel argued that while it may have been reck­
less on the part o f the accused not to make further inquiries, there was 
no duty on him to do so. In convicting the accused, Fuller Co. Ct. J. 
stated:
In view o f  the fact that there was some argument on the point as to 
whether the accused was merely reckless and was not bound to pursue his 
inquiry as to the source o f  the goods further, I probably should express my 
views o f  this point . . .
Assuming for the purpose o f  argument that the question was, in fact, 
asked in good faith, the answer at best, was evasive. Having regard to the 
surrounding circumstances such as the type o f  the goods, some new and 
valuable, the fact that the goods were at a private house being sold by a private 
individual as scrap, I do not think the circumstances were such that this 
accused was entitled to stop where he indicates he did. In my opinion, on 
these facts, he deliberately refrained from asking for further information 
to avoid obtaining knowledge which would be dangerous to him, namely, 
that the goods were stolen. Certainly, the surrounding circumstances 
together with the evasive answer indicated quite strongly that the goods were 
improperly come by and that further enquiry would disclose this.
On the facts in this case, I do not think that this accused was entitled  
to refrain from making further enquiries and thus avoid being told that the 
goods were stolen.
t%lbtd., at 72-73 per MrPhillips, J.A.
*•«. v. Marabella (1956), 117 C.C.C. 78 (Ont. Co. Ct.).
182 U.N.B. LAW JOURNAL
As I understand the law, if a party has his suspicions aroused but then 
deliberately omits to make further enquiry because he wishes to remain 
in ignorance, he is deem ed to have knowledge and on the facts, this accused 
is in this position in this case.17
The apparent overlap between the doctrine of recent possession and 
the doctrine of wilful blindness has caused a considerable amount of 
confusion. This is best demonstrated by reference to the Supreme Court 
of Canada decision in Graham v. The Queen.28 In that case, the appellant 
was convicted of having in his possession stolen Government o f Canada 
bonds. His explanation was that he had received the bonds from a man 
named Moore whom he had met in a bar in the City of Detroit. 
Moore said that he was unable to enter Canada and cash the bonds himself 
because of problems he was having with the immigration officials. 
Graham, for a fee of ten per cent, agreed to cash the bonds at a Windsor, 
Ontario bank. He was arrested after cashing several of these bonds in 
Canada. The sole theory of the defence was that the accused had offered 
an explanation o f his possession of the bonds which might reasonably be 
true. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, dismissed the appeal:
T he error assigned by counsel for the appellant is that the learned trial 
Judge did actually find that the explanation given by the accused might reason­
ably be true but that, in spite o f this, he proceeded to convict because the accused 
should have knoum that the bonds were stolen. I f  this were so, the appeal would 
succeed because an approach such as this would place an onus on the accused of  
offering an exculpatory explanation going beyond the bounds laid down by the 
authorities. I am, however, satisfied that the reasons for judgm ent o f  the learned 
trial Judge are not open to this construction. While there are certain expres­
sions in the reasons which might indicate that he thought there were elements 
o f probability in the story told by the accused, on a weighing o f  the story 
as a whole and after a consideration o f  it, step by step, he rejected it 
decisively in the following conclusion: “The explanation that the accused 
has given on the stand by his actions and all that he has done all through 
these transactions, could not reasonably be true, and the explanation could 
not be believed by anyone, and there is nothing before me whereby I could 
possibly believe it, and that being the case, all I can do is find the accused 
guilty as charged."
It was also argued for the appellant that the learned trial Judge erred in 
law in that he directed him self that if  he disbelieved the explanation o f  the 
accused he was bound to convict. In my opinion the learned Judge did not so 
direct himself. He appears on a consideration o f  all the evidence to have 
reached the conclusion that it was inconsistent with any rational explanation 
other than the guilt o f  the accused. He clearly reached and stated the con­
clusion that the appellant “could not possibly not have known” that the bonds 
were stolen.29 (emphasis added)
The crux of the m atter is whether or not the doctrine of wilful 
blindness rests upon the application o f an objective test. Professor
" M ,  at 84-85 per Fuller, Co. Ct. J.
*•Graham v. The Queen (1959), 124 C.C.C. 314 (S.C.C.).
**Ibid., at 315-316 (S.C.C.)per Judson, J.
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Stuart has recently noted the general erosion of subjective mens rea in 
our criminal law.30 This concern was echoed by Glanville Williams:
The rule that wilful blindness is equivalent to knowledge is essential, and 
is found throughout the criminal law. It is, at the same time, an unstable rule, 
because judges are apt to forget its very limited scope. A court can properly 
find wilful blindness only where it can almost be said that the defendant 
actually knew. He suspected the fact; he realized its probability; but he re­
frained from obtaining the final confirmation because he wanted in the event 
to be able to deny knowledge. This, and this alone, is wilful blindness. It 
requires in effect a finding that the defendant intended to cheat the adminis­
tration o f  justice. Any wider definition would make the doctrine o f  wilful 
blindness indistinguishable from the civil doctrine o f  negligence in not obtaining 
knowledge.31
The possession of stolen goods cases do not provide an answer to 
the subjective - objective controversy. His Honour Judge Graburn 
explained:
It appears that the line separating the tortious theory o f  liability and the 
doctrine o f  wilful blindness is exceedingly tenuous in view o f the judgm ents 
in The Zamora, Baldwin et al., Pomeroy, McRitchie, Marabella, Lopatinsky,
Cooper and Chimirri. There was no reference to these cases at all by the Supreme 
Court o f  Canada in Graham.
It may be that in receiving cases because o f  the doctrine o f recent pos- 
pession and its resultant consequences, the explanation that might reasonably 
be true, the doctrine o f wilful blindness is somewhat circumscribed and has a 
unique application. It is difficult to reconcile wilful blindness with explanations 
that mignt reasonably be true. T he Ungaro rule has, it is submitted, been 
strained by the courts to incredible lengths. T he true meaning o f  Ungaro, 
namely, has the Crown proven knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt, has 
been demolished by some co u rts..........
It is accordingly submitted that the sole reason for the circumscription o f  
the doctrine o f wilful blindness as indicated in the Graham case with reference 
to possession arises out o f a misconception o f  the decisive ratio o f  Ungaro 
and the fantastic lengths to which the courts have gone in extending the mis­
conception o f  the Ungaro rule.32
Accordingly, it is appropriate to turn to another line of cases which 
discussed the concept of wilful blindness apart from any conflict with the 
doctrine of recent possession. The majority of these cases involve the 
possession and importation of narcotics. As early as 1947, in the case of 
R. v. Ryan,33 a decision of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, the doctrine 
began to make its appearance in drug related cases. Ryan worked as a 
druggist’s clerk in Halifax. Part of his duties included making up boxes 
of drugs for the use of troops on sea-going ships. When he was found
S#D. R. Stuart, Criminal Law and Procedure, (1977) 9 Ottawa L.R. 568, at 580-591.
s*Grabum, supra, footnote 4, at 70-71. The reader should note that in Graham the Supreme
Court of Canada did not cite Ungaro and did not use the phrase "wilful blindness”.
*'Supra, footnote 2, at 159.
siR. v. Ryan (1947), 90 C.C.C. 98 (N.S.S.C.).
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at home with prohibited drugs in his possession he stated that he had 
taken them home for safe-keeping and fully intended to return  them to 
his office. At trial, the ju ry  returned a verdict o f “guilty without criminal 
intent” and upon questioning from the bench indicated that it was their 
opinion that possession of the prohibited narcotics was a result o f careless­
ness. Mr. Justice Doull construed the verdict to be a verdict o f “guilty”.
In dismissing the appeal, Graham J. stated:
The argument made to this Court was, that the verdict should have been 
held to be “not guilty”, because it negatived criminal intent. The jury explained  
the matters which they thought negatived criminal intent, and their explanation  
was part o f  the verdict.
Section 4(1) (d) o f  the Opium and Narcotic Drug Act, 1929 (Can.), 49 has been 
before the Courts o f  Canada many times, and it is established that nothing 
more than proof o f  possession is necessary to constitute an offence under 
i t ..........
That being so, since the accused swore that he had possession, and the jury 
found accordingly, the fact that he had no intention o f “converting” the 
drugs “to his own use or selling them ” was immaterial. Neither did the later 
part o f  the explanatory findings, —  i.e., “It was more through carelessness 
than anything else that he had it in his possession for that length o f  time” 
affect the verdict o f  guilt. That implied knowledge and confirmed the 
finding o f possession.34
O f course, it can be argued that this decision does not, in fact, 
recognize a doctrine of wilful blindness in Canadian criminal jurisprudence. 
First, as in so many of the cases, the phrase “wilful blindness” was not 
used by the Court. Second, the Court held that “carelessness” implies 
knowledge. This is crucial in view of the distinction Williams drew 
between wilful blindness and recklessness and “not caring”.35
In 1968, the British Columbia Court of Appeal was presented with 
an excellent opportunity to discuss the doctrine of wilful blindness in 
the case o f R. v. Beyer.36 Boyer, along with two other young men, was 
charged with importing marijuana into Canada. At trial, the appellant 
was convicted and the minimum sentence of seven years imprisonment 
was imposed upon him.
The accused had borrowed a friend’s car and driven to the United 
States. A routine search at the border upon his return to Canada 
produced twelve packages of marijuana entwined in the springs o f the 
back seat. The appellant argued that he had no knowledge of any 
packages under the back seat and therefore obviously knew nothing of
**lbtd., at 99-100 per Graham, J. 
ilSupra, footnote 2, at 159.
»•*. v. Bayer. [1969] 1 C.C.C. 106 (B.C.C.A.).
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what they contained.37 Without resort to the doctrine o f wilful 
blindness, the Court adopted familiar language in allowing the 
appeal and directing a new trial:
I see nothing in s. 5 o f  the Narcotic Control Act to exclude the 
principle o f  mens rea.
In som e cases the very com m ission o f  the acts constituting the  
o ffen ce  charged  carries with it an in ference  o f  guilty in ten tion .
In the case o f  bar, however, the mere bringing o f  marijuana into 
C anada h id d en  in the borrow ed car d o es not o f  itse lf  prove  
guilty intention. There must be something more than this, some exndence proving 
directly or from which it may properly be inferred that the appellant mas aware or 
ought to have been aware, or, as a responsible person, had some reason to suspect 
that marijuana might be present in the car. I have support for what I have said in 
the judgm ent o f  Cartwright J. in Beaver v. The Queen, 118 C.C.C. 129, 26 C.R.
193, [1957] S.C.R. 531. Although the judgment dealt with unlawful 
possession o f  a narcotic, in my view the principles enunciated apply 
with equal force to cases o f unlawful importation into Canada o f  a 
narcotic.38 (emphasis added)
Two years later, in the well known case of R. v. Blondin,39 the same 
Court specifically adopted the phrase “wilful blindness” in reaching its 
decision. Blondin had imported hashish into Canada in a scuba tank. He 
contended successfully at trial that he did not know the substance was 
hashish and therefore could not be convicted. During questioning Blondin 
stated that he knew there was something in the tank and that it was 
illegal. The British Columbia Court of Appeal allowed the appeal by 
the Crown and directed a new trial. The reference by Robertson, J.A. 
to “mens rea in its widest sense” has been subjected to considerable
,TIbid., at 128 per Robertson, J.A. At 125 the comments o f Tysoe, J.A. suggested a different 
interpretation of the facts: "Being of the view that the jury, properly instructed and acting reasonably, 
could infer on the totality o f the evidence that there was guilty knowledge and intention on the part 
o f the appellant, I would not direct that a verdict o f acquittal be entered. As I propose to order 
a new trial, I shall not discuss the portions of the evidence that persuade me to this view."
—Ibid., at 120-121 per Tysoe, J.A. At 130 Robertson, J.A. presented a more limited interpre­
tation o f the Beaver decision: “Beaver v. The Queen . . . (that is to say, the majority judgm ent o f Rand, 
Locke and Cartwright, J.J.) decided that one who was charged with being in possession of a drug 
under s. 4( 1) (d ) . .  . o f the Optum and Narcotic Drug A c t . . .  could not be convicted unless it was proved 
that he had knowledge that the substance in his possession was a forbidden substance. This, it was made 
clear, was so because o f the doctrine o f mens rea, the application of which to cases under the Act
had not been excluded by the legislation. The reasoning there must apply equally to offences under the 
Narcotic Control Act, supra. For example, a necessary ingredient o f the offence of possession under s. 3 
is knowledge on the part o f the accused that he had a substance in his possession and that the 
substance was a narcotic; and a necessary ingredient of the offence o f importing under s. 5 is knowledge 
on the part o f the accused that he was importing a substance into Canada and that the substance was a 
narcotic."
3*R. v. Blondín (1970), 2 C.C.C. (2d) 118 (B.C.C.A.).
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juridical and academic analysis.40 Unfortunately, little attention has been 
focused on the comments immediately following:
These reasons will, I fear, dispose o f  this case inadequately if  I do not 
indicate how I think the jury could properly have found mens rea in the 
circumstances o f  this case. They could have done so if they found that Blondin 
had been paid to smuggle a substance illegally into Canada and either was 
reckless about what it was or wilfully shut his eyes to what it was, inferring 
therefrom that he suspected that it might be a narcotic. It follows that the 
learned Judge ought to have told the jury that they might convict if they 
found that Blondin brought the substance into Canada from Japan and knew 
that it was a narcotic. H e should also have instructed the ju ry  that they might convict if  
they found that he had brought the substance into Canada illegally and had either 
been reckless about what it was or wilfully shut his eyes to what it was, and then 
drew the inference that he suspected that it might be a narcotic.41 (emphasis added)
Discussion of this case is generally limited to the proposition that to 
support a charge of importing narcotics into Canada, the Crown need not 
prove that the accused knew that the substance he is importing is hashish,
‘•"Basing my opinion upon what I understood to be the principle enunciated in the several passages 
I have quoted, I am of the respectful opinion that the learned trial Judge erred when he instructed 
the jury that, in order to find Blondin guilty, they must find that he knew tnat the substance in the tank 
was cannabis resin. It would be sufficient to find, in relation to a narcotic, mens rea in its widest sense.
It remains to decide whether the Judge could properly instruct the jury  that, if they were 
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Blondin knew that it was illegal to import the substance in 
the tank, they might find him guilty, even though he did not know that the substance was a narcotic.
I am not prepared to so hold. An essential ingredient of the offence is the importation of a 
narcotic and I do not consider that mens rea qua that offence is proven by an intention to commit an 
offence which, so far as Blondin’s admitted knowledge went, might have been one against the 
Customs Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 58.” Ibid., at 131 per Robertson, |.A.
See R. v. Kundeus (1976), 32 C.R.N.S. 129 (S.C.C.); J. M. Weiler, Regina v. Kundeus: The Saga of 
Two Ships Passing in the Night, (1976) 14 Osgoode Hall L.J. 457 and the case comment on R. v. Kundeus 
by E. Oscapella, at (1976), 8 Ottawa, L.R. 91.
*'R. v. Blondin, supra, at 131-132 per Robertson, J.A. The two remaining judges who heard the appeal 
also recognized the doctrine o f wilful blindness. Davey, C.J.B.C. at 120: “In the circumstances o f this 
case, I think the learned trial Judge ought to have instructed the jury  that they should convict if they 
found beyond a reasonable doubt that Blondin brought the substance into Canada knowing that it was a 
narcotic, or being reckless about its nature, or wilfully shutting his eyes to what it was.”
McFarlane, J.A. at 122-123: "I accordingly agree that it would be correct to instruct a jury  that 
the existence o f that knowledge may be inferred as a fact, with due regard to all the circumstances, 
if the jury finds that the accused has recklessly or wilfully shut his eyes or refrained from inquiry as 
to the nature of the substance he imports.”
T he Court adopted the language of Lord Reid in Warner v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner,
[1962] 2 A.C. 256, at 279-280 (H.L.): “The object o f this legislation is to penalise possession of certain 
drugs. So if mens rea has not been excluded what would be required would be the knowledge of the 
accused that he had prohibited drugs in his possession: it would be no defence, though it would be a 
mitigation, that he did not intend that they should be used improperly. And it is commonplace 
that, if the accused had a suspicion but deliberately shut his eyes, the court or jury  is well entitled 
to hold him guilty. Further it would be pedantic to hold that it must be shown that the accused 
knew precisely which drug he had in his possession. Ignorance o f the law is no defence and in fact 
virtually everyone knows that there are prohibited drugs. So it would be quite sufficient to prove facts 
from which it could properly be inferred that the accused knew that he had a prohibited d rug in his 
possession. That would not lead to an unreasonable result. In a case like this Parliament, if consulted, 
might think it right to transfer the onus o f proof so that an accused would have to prove that he 
neither knew nor had any reason to suspect that he had a prohibited drug in his possession 
But I am unable to find sufficient grounds for imputing to Parliament an intention to deprive the 
accused of all right to show that he had no knowledge or reason to suspect that any prohibited 
drug  was in his premises or in a container which was in his possession.”
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but only must be aware that the substance is an illegal narcotic.42 
Clearly the decision also provides the Crown with an alternative mode of 
proving knowledge through the application o f the doctrine of wilful 
blindness. A broad application is prevented by the suggestion that an 
accused’s suspicion must be directed toward the presence o f an illegal 
narcotic as opposed to other materials, prohibited or otherwise.43
The doctrine has been applied in a num ber o f drug cases following the 
decision o f Blondin. In R. v. Overvold44 the accused was found in 
possession of a pipe-stem which contained traces of Cannabis resin. 
Although the decision rested, in part, on the application of the maxim 
de minimus non curat lex the comments of de Weerdt, J.M.C. are well worth 
noting since they appear to establish an objective test for the determ ina­
tion of wilful blindness:
Taking into account that the defendant knew what the pipe-stem was part 
o f  and had been used for, was he then so wilfully blind to the possibility 
o f  it bearing traces o f  a prohibited narcotic that he should be treated as 
having had the requisite knowledge o f  its presence, so as to warrant conviction 
upon this charge. Counsel have both referred to the recent decision o f  the
British Columbia Court o f  Appeal in R. v. Blondin ..........
T he facts in that case were that the defendant knew he was carrying a 
narcotic, but did not know it was cannabis resin. In the case now before me, 
can it be said that the defendant knew, in the legal sense, that he was carrying 
a narcotic? If he is to be fixed with that knowledge, then there is no problem
as held in the Blondin case, over what kind o f  narcotic it w a s..........
If there was any “mistake o f fact” defence open to the defendant here, it 
rested not upon what kind o f prohibited substance he thought he may have 
had, but on whether he "knew” he had such a substance at all, i.e., “knew" 
in the expanded sense mentioned by Davey.C.J.B.C. But that kind o f knowledge,
I think it should be said, is not to be considered in such a wide sense as to 
attribute mens rea in relation to a narcotic merely on the basis o f actual 
knowledge that the substance is, say, contraband. I do not read the reasons 
o f the Court in the Blondin case as going so far, and I do not feel that it is for
“ Weiler, supra, footnote 40, at 464. In a comment on the Kundeus decision, Prof. Stuart, supra, 
footnote .30, at 582-583 stated: “The majority judgm ent carefully avoids passing on the specific ruling 
of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Blondm that mere knowledge (in the extended sense) of 
illegality will not suffice to secure a conviction and that what is required is knowledge or wilful 
blindness of the fact that the substance is a narcotic. T he significance of this is ambiguous since 
the ruling seems to be implicit in the approval of the cited passage from Blondin.
In conclusion it seems, on the basis o f Beaver, Blondin and the majority judgm ent in Kundeus, 
that, in a drug prosecution under either the Narcotics Control Act o r the Food and Drug Act, the 
prosecution must prove knowledge or wilful blindness in respect of the fact that the substance possessed 
was a prohibited drug  and that it is immaterial under which statute the drug is proscribed or 
what the penalty might be. It is arguable that a requirement of knowledge or wilful blindness as to the 
precise drug possessed might lead to too many acquittals, but perhaps the answer to this contention lies, 
as Laskin, C.J.C. indicated, in legislation to provide for a conviction for the lesser offence. It is 
unfortunate that the majority of Kundeus did not explore the implications of their judgm ent for 
mens rea generally."
4*“ . .  .it would be wrong to instruct the jury  that proof of knowledge that the substance was one 
which it would be unlawful to import is itself sufficient to support a conviction. The offence of 
smuggling goods which may be imported lawfully on disclosure and payment of customs duty is, for 
this purpose, I think, essentially different from that of importing a narcotic which Parliament has 
declared to be a serious offence." Supra, footnote 39, at 121 per McFarlane, J.A.
**R. v. Overvold (1972), 9 C.C.C. (2d) 517 (N.W.T. Mag. Ct.).
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me to stretch things further than the higher Courts have so far seen fit to go.
What the Court said, in my understanding, is that failing actual knowledge 
that he had the alleged narcotic, the accused may be convicted if he was 
merely reckless or wilfully shut his eyes to what “it” was, i.e., to its character 
as a narcotic substance which he knew he had in his actual possession or 
co n tro l..........
There is nothing before me, in my judgm ent, from which I could, or at least 
should, infer that the defendant at the time even suspected that the pipe­
stem . . .  contained any kind o f  prohibited drug whatsoever..........I f  there was any
reason to suspect the presence of more than an infinitesimal trace o f such a sub­
stance, the defendant might indeed have suspected its nature; but it was not reasonable 
fo r  him, as an average sort o f man, to suspect the actual presence o f a substantial 
or measurable amount of any such substance in the circumstances, or to believe that a 
tiny microscopic trace could or would be prohibited under penal sanction 
pursuant to the laws o f  Canada.4* (emphasis added)
Two recent decisions from the Ontario Court of Appeal offer little 
guidance. In R. v. Duffy46 the Court heard an appeal from conviction 
on a charge of importing a narcotic. The appellant had taken delivery of 
a shipment of Cannabis resin. In the charge to the jury the trial judge 
stated:
You cannot find a man guilty o f  importing a narcotic into Canada if he 
doesn’t know he is importing it, or has no good reason to know that he is importing 
it, and the gist or really the crux o f  this case here is whether, in fact, the 
accused knew or ought to have known from the circumstances o f  which he was
fully aware that he was taking part in an importation o f  a narcotic..........if
you feel that from the evidence o f  the Crown you can draw a conclusive 
inference that he knew or must have known that he was involved in the importation 
o f  this narcotic, and you have no reasonable doubt about it, then it is open  
to you to find him guilty.47 (emphasis added)
The Ontario Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new 
trial. In reaching their decision they cited no case authority and did not 
allude to the doctrine of wilful blindness. The Court took exception to 
the use of such phrases as “ought to have known” or “must have known”. 
Schroeder, J.A. stated:
What the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the accused 
man had actual knowledge that what he was importing was not necessarily 
cannabis resin as charged, but that he was importing a narcotic or other drug
“Ibid., at 522-524 per de Weerdt, J.M.C. T he case o f R. v. S. (1974), 17 C.C.C. (2d) 181 
(Man. Prov. Ct.) also involved a pipe containing traces o f cannabis resin. At 186 Johnston 
Prov. Ct. J . stated: “If one has possession of a substance, the specific nature o f which is known to 
that person, it is no defence to state merely that the person was not aware that the substance was 
considered a narcotic by law. Rather, the questions to be asked in such cases are: Is there sufficient 
facts before the Court to draw a reasonable inference that the person had actual knowledge of the 
presence o f cannabis resin in the pipe? If the answer to that question is no, then, is there evidence 
to indicate that the person suspected the presence o f cannabis resin in the pipe and was “wilfully 
blind” to it?”
v. Duffy (1973), 11 C.C.C. (2d) 519 (Ont. C.A.).
i7Ibtd., at 5 19-520per Schroeder, J .
DOCTRINE OF WILFUL BLINDNESS 189
the importation o f  which is prohibited by the provisions o f  the Narcotic 
Control Act. It is not sufficient to prove that he “ought to have known" or 
that he “must have known” that fact.48
In 1978, the Ontario Court of Appeal was presented with a factual 
situation tailor-made for the application o f the doctrine o f wilful blind­
ness. In R. v. Aiello*9 the Crown successfully appealed the accused’s 
acquittal on a charge of possession o f heroin for the purpose o f traf­
ficking. At trial police testified that the accused was seen to come out of a 
restaurant washroom where they knew heroin had been cached. The 
accused was arrested and the heroin was found on his person. Aiello 
testified that a man named Jim offered him money to pick up the package. 
He initially suspected the package contained jewellery but when he saw it 
he, in his own words, “figured it had to be some kind of drug”. 
Martin J.A. stated:
We are all o f  the view that the learned trial Judge fell into a serious 
error in instructing the jury that the Crown, in order to establish possession, 
was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent knew that 
the package contained heroin. We are also o f  the view that the trial Judge  
erred in failing to direct the jury that the knowledge on the part o f  the 
respondent necessary to constitute the offence, need not be proved by direct 
evidence but could be inferred from all the surrounding circumstances.
In our view, the trial Judge should have directed the jury that if they were 
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent assumed control o f  
the package, knowing that it contained a drug, the trafficking in which was 
prohibited, or was wilfully blind to it being such a drug or was reckless as to 
whether it was such a prohibited drug, then the knowledge necessary to 
constitute the offence was established. The trial Judge in our view should 
have further directed the jury that it was not necessary for the prosecution 
to prove the required knowledge by direct evidence, but that it could be 
inferred from the surrounding circumstances, such as, for example, the 
finding o f  the drug on the accused’s person in his trouser pant leg, his 
evidence that he figured that it must be a drug, the circumstances in 
which, and the place where he had picked up the package.50
T he Court cited no case authority in reaching their decision. They 
also failed to instruct on the question o f which test subsequent courts 
should use to determine the issue of knowledge in cases applying the 
doctrine of wilful blindness, i.e., objective, subjective, or a combination 
thereof. Phrases such as “ought to have known” or “must have known” will 
be frowned upon by appellate courts. However, decisions such as 
Boyer51 and Overuold52 suggest that terminology such as “ought to have
*'I b i d at 520 per Schroeder, J.
**R. v. Aiello (1978), 38 C.C.C. (2d) 485 (Ont. C.A.). 
ltIbid., at 488 per Martin, J.A. 
llSupra, footnote 36.
MSupra, footnote 44.
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been aware” or “ought to have suspected” will be acceptable. Failure 
by the Courts to elaborate on this rather tenuous distinction is clearly 
unsatisfactory.
As indicated earlier, the Courts have now started to apply the doctrine 
o f wilful blindness in a num ber o f new areas. For example, in R. v. 
McFall et al.53 the British Columbia Court o f Appeal adopted the doctrine 
of wilful blindness in relation to a charge of knowingly without lawful 
justification or excuse having possession of obscene films for the purpose 
of exposing them to public view. The films, which were owned by the 
accused, were shown in cubicles at the back o f a book store. Signs had 
been posted reading: “Restricted to persons over 18” and “Sex-exciting 
movies”. The provincial censor testified that he had approved the films 
and classified them as restricted. However, following a voir dire, the 
trial judge ruled that he could not give in evidence the basis for his decision. 
In his charge, the trial Judge refused to instruct the jury that the approval 
of the censor could be a lawful justification or excuse. Rather, he told 
them this evidence went only to the question o f knowledge by the 
accused that the film was obscene.
The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered. The majority 
found the fact that the provincial censor had approved a film did not 
constitute a lawful justification or excuse. Robertson J.A. dissented on 
this point.54 T he censor’s approval did not mean that the film was not 
obscene; it was merely evidence which the jury  could consider in reaching 
its conclusion on the issue of obscenity. The trial judge erred in excluding 
the censor’s evidence as to the criteria used in judging the film. This 
evidence was relevant to, and some evidence of, the standard of the com­
munity with respect to the acceptability of the films.
The Court also held that the Crown had established the requisite 
knowledge “if it shows that the accused had knowledge, not that the film 
was obscene in the legal sense, but that they had knowledge of its nature, 
that is that it was a film of which a dom inant characteristic was the 
exploitation of sex.”55 The Court considered several factors, including 
the posted signs and the accused’s knowledge of the censor’s classification, 
and found there was sufficient evidence o f knowledge upon which a jury 
could act. The Court went on to state that even if there was no actual
* * «. V. McFall ft al. (1975), 26 C.C.C. (2d) 181 (B.C.C.A.).
s*Ibtd., per Taggart, J., Carrothers, J.A. concurring. At 185-186 Robertson, J.A. stated: "in my 
opinion it is for the jury  in each case to find whether any circumstance o f the situation which 
is itself lawful, when viewed with all the other circumstances, constitutes in their opinion (or
judgment) an excuse for what the accused did . . . .  It follows from what I have said that the approval 
o f the film classification director does not as a matter o f law constitute a lawful excuse, but that it 
is open to the jury  to find as a fact that it does.”
S u p ra , footnote 53, at 194 per Taggart, J.A.
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knowledge the doctrine of wilful blindness would apply in the circum­
stances:
It seems to me that, even if one accepts (without deciding) Dr. Williams’ 
contention that “a court can properly find wilful blindness only where it can 
almost be said that the defendant actually knew,” in the case at bar the 
Crown has advanced sufficient proof to satisfy that requirement.58
A series of three cases from the Ontario Court of Appeal suggest a 
movement toward the position taken by Glanville Williams. These 
decisions, which do not involve drug charges, specifically rejected the 
use of an objective test in the application of the doctrine of wilful 
blindness. The most important o f these decisions may well be R. v. 
Currie. 57 A stranger had approached Currie in a hotel and asked him 
to cash a cheque at a nearby bank. Currie was to be paid five dollars 
for this service. He took the cheque, which was stolen, cashed it and gave 
the proceeds to this unknown man. Currie’s appeal from conviction 
was allowed:
. .  . the trial Judge’s reasons for judgm ent is not free from ambiguity and 
is reasonably open to the conclusion that the learned trial Judge was o f the 
view that the doctrine o f  wilful blindness applied because the accused should  
have been suspicious in all the circumstances o f the forged endorsement on the 
cheque when he received it and should have made further inquiry.
This was a misconception on the part o f the trial Judge as to the doctrine
o f  wilful blindness, which he purported to a p p ly ..........The fa c t that a person
ought to have known that certain facts existed, while it may, fo r  some purposes in civil 
proceedings, .be equivalent to actual knowledge, does not constitute knowledge fo r  
the purpose o f criminal liability, and does not by itself form  a basis fo r  the application 
of the doctrine o f wilful blindness.58 (emphasis added)
Professor Stuart categorized this decision as an implied extension 
of mens rea to recklessness. He stated:
s*Ibid., at 198 per Taggart, J. The Court also quoted extensively from Blcmdm and cited R. v. 
Lee (1971), 3 C.C.C. (2d) 306 (B.C.S.C.). in that case the Court considered an appeal by way ot 
stated case from a conviction for selling a publication containing obscene matter. The appellant, 
a Chinese grover, sold a pocket book which was found to be obscene. The appellant could 
not read english. At 308, Munroe J. stated: “The object o f s. 150 (2) (a) is to penalize the sale 
of obscene written matter and if the appellant had a suspicion that the book in question was obscene 
but deliberately shut his eyes to what it was, the Court is well entitled to hold him guilty:
l7R. v. Cume (1957), 23 C.C.C. (2d) 292 (Ont. C.A.). In a recent decision involving a charge o f fraud, 
the Ontario Court o f Appeal has specifically adopted the majority position in Currie. See R. v. Stone 
(1978), 40 C.C.C. (2d) 241 (Ont. C.A.).
**Ibtd., at 295-296 per Martin, J.A . In his dissent Gale, C.J.P. stated at 293: "I need not go into the 
circumstances o f the case because it is my judgm ent that, although not expressinghimself in his 
judgm ent as clearly as he might have, the Judge made sufficient findings to support the decision 
that the appellant was guilty on the ground o f wilful blindness.
I base my conclusion on the Finding of the Judge that the appellant "deliberately or knowingly" 
neglected to make the inquiries which he ought to have made. Such a Finding plainly suggests 
that the Judge decided that the appellant was in fact suspicious o f the authenticity of the cheque, for 
otherwise he could not have “deliberately" failed to make the necessary inquiries."
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. . .  it is encouraging to note that the majority o f  the Ontario Court o f  Appeal
rejected a purely objective approach in Regina v. C urrie ..........A passage from
Granville Williams concerning the doctrine o f  wilful blindness was quoted 
with approval, but no reference was made to that author’s double-barrelled 
concept ot recklessness which requires not only subjective foresight o f the risk, 
but also unjustified assumption or creation o f it, a matter which must be 
determined objectively. It would seem that this limited objective aspect is 
necessarily inherent in any otherwise subjective test o f  recklessness.59
On this point, while most commentators would prefer an objective- 
subjective fusion as opposed to an objective-constructive knowledge test, it 
may be prem ature to equate the doctrine of wilful blindness with the 
rather confused current state of recklessness. At the risk of being overly 
repetitive one must bear in mind the caution expressed by Glanville 
Williams: “Recklessness and ‘not caring’ are not quite the same thing as 
wilful blindness; such words express the latter doctrine rather too 
widely.”60
The fact situation in Currie is remarkably similar to that of 
Graham v. The Queen61 although the charge in the latter case was possession 
of stolen property while in the former the charge was uttering a forged 
document. The Ontario Court of Appeal found it unnecessary to cite 
either Graham or the doctrine of recent possession. The singular case 
authority relied on by the Court was its decision in R. v. F. W. Woolworth 
Co. Ltd.,*2 an appeal by way of stated case from a conviction for misleading 
advertising contrary to Section 36 of the Combines Investigation Act.63 
The accused agreed to allow one Healey to demonstrate and sell “Auto 
Magic” pens in their store. Under the oral agreement the store received 
thirty per cent of the sales. There was no discussion with respect to 
Healey being an employee of Woolworth and the parties understood 
that Healey was in business for himself. Further, there was no discussion 
of Healey being a representative or agent of the accused. Healey and his 
employee, McPhee, made several misleading representations while selling 
this product. The Ontario Court of Appeal quashed the conviction. 
The Court held that Woolworth was not vicariously liable for the acts 
of Healey and McPhee. They also found that Woolworth was not a party 
to the offence.
At trial, the Court found that “Woolworth knew, or ought to have 
known, by informing itself as to what was said by Mr. McPhee”. Kelly J.A. 
clearly rejected the use of constructive knowledge in criminal cases:
**Supra, footnote 30, at 577-578. See supra, footnote 2, at 159-172.
**Supra, footnote 2, at 159.
•*«. v. F. W. Woolworth Co. Ltd. (1974), 18 C.C.C. (2d) 23 (Ont. C.A.). 
tsCombines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23.
*K)raham v. The Queen (1959), 124 C.C.C. 314 (S.C.C.).
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Devlin J., in Roper v. Taylor’s . .  . described three degrees o f  knowledge —  
first, actual knowledge; second, the situation where the person to whom the 
knowledge is imputed deliberately refrains from making inquiries, the result 
o f  which he might not care to have, and third, constructive knowledge often 
described as the words “ought to have known” meaning that the person had in 
effect the means o f  knowledge . . .
Since there is no foundation for the conclusion that Fawcett deliberately 
refrained from making inquiries as to McPhee’s conduct in making sales, the 
finding o f  the trial Court was one o f constructive knowledge which in criminal 
law is not knowledge at all.64
The Ontario Court o f Appeal has recently considered the doctrine of 
wilful blindness in relation to a charge for an offence against the environ­
ment. In R. v. City of Sault Ste. M arie65 the accused was charged that it 
“unlawfully did discharge or caused to be discharged or permitted to be 
discharged or deposited material” in a m anner which might impair the 
quality of water contrary to Section 32(1) o f the Ontario Water Resources 
Act.™ The municipality had entered into an agreement with a private 
company for the disposal of the city’s garbage. Part o f the agreement 
stated that if the company failed to perform any of its obligations the 
city engineer could, on twenty-four hours notice, enter the disposal site 
and perform at the company’s expense any such obligations. The agree­
ment also stated that the company was required to perform  the disposal 
operations to the satisfaction of the city engineer and the medical officer 
of health. At trial, the Court found that the engineer and the medical 
officer made only casual inspections. Rather than order the removal of 
accumulated refuse on the banks of a river these officials simply 
ordered that no more dum ping take place in that area.
The trial Judge found that the municipality had “perm itted” the 
deposit of the material. He also held that the offence was one of strict 
liability. On appeal, the Divisional Court quashed the conviction on the 
basis that the information was multifarious. In the result, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal ordered a new trial. The Court held proof of knowledge 
was required. Accordingly, the trial Judge erred in convicting the 
accused without considering whether the requisite mens rea had been 
established. The conviction could only be upheld if the findings of fact 
were sufficient to establish either actual knowledge o r wilful blindness 
on the part of the accused:
After carefully reviewing the findings o f the learned trial Judge, I do not 
consider that they are sufficient to establish actual knowledge on the part o f  the 
City that the garbage and refuse . . . was o f  sufficient quantity that if it remained 
where it was, it might result in the contamination o f  the nearby stream..........
**R. v. Sault Ste. Mane (1976), 30 C.C.C. (2d) 257 (Ont. C.A.). The Supreme Court of Canada decision, 
reported at (1978), 40 C.C.C. (2d) 353 did not consider the doctrine of wilful blindness.
*4Supra, footnote 62, at 30 per Kelly, J.A.
"Ontario Water Resources Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 332.
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Knowledge that the addition o f  further garbage to the existing accumulation 
might result in contamination is not knowledge that the existing accumulation 
poses a danger.
As to the matter o f  wilful blindness, I do not question the Finding o f  the 
trial Judge that the City was casual in its inspections and so the dum ping that 
occurred in May in the prohibited area was undetected. Having regard to the 
onus o f  proof in this type o f  case, this finding was more consistent with 
negligence than with wilful blindness in deliberately refraining from making 
inspections. In the absence of proof of actual knowledge, wilful blindness must be 
established in order to sustain a conviction. Neglecting to make such inspections as a 
reasonable and prudent person would make is quite insufficient; it is only tantamount 
to constructive knowledge which in criminal law is not knowledge at all.*7 (emphasis 
added)
The preceeding discussion has sought to demonstrate that the doctrine 
of wilful blindness is firmly entrenched in Canadian criminal law. It is 
clear that the Courts will not hesitate to advance the doctrine in new and 
varied areas. It is equally unclear which test they will use to determine 
the presence or absence of wilful blindness. Wilful blindness may 
require a totally unique approach to the issue of knowledge or it may be 
seen as nothing more than an extension of the concept of recklessness. 
On the other hand, the applicable test may very well be dependent 
upon the nature o f the charge. Ultimately the answer lies with the 
Supreme Court of Canada. The C ourt’s apparent inability to unravel 
the mysteries o f mens rea has been well docum ented.68 It is not unduly 
harsh to suggest that the Supreme C ourt’s analysis o f the doctrine of 
wilful blindness is awaited with guarded optimism and a certain amount 
of apprehension.
*7Supra, footnote 65, at 283-284 per Brooke, J.A., Howland, J.A. concurring. In his dissent, 
Lacourciere, J.A. stated at 299: “In my view, the inescapable inference to be drawn from the findings 
o f fact of the learned trial Judge is that, in the relevant period o f time, the City had knowledge 
of the potential impairment of the creek and river waters and failed to exercise its clear power of
control."
'•See P. Weiler, The Supreme Court of Canada and The Doctrines of Mens Rea, (1971) 49 Can. Bar 
Rev. 280; D. R. Stuart, The Need to Codify Clear, Realistic and Honest Measures of Mens Rea and 
Negligence, (1973) 15 Crim. L. Q. 160.
